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is special issue collects papers attempting a political turn in foundational
theories ofmeaning. In the philosophies ofmind and language, there has in-
deed already been a remarkable turn toward the political in recent decades.
ink for instance of the literatures on the political dynamics of speech acts,
the semantics and pragmatics of slurs, the adequacy of certain words’ mean-
ings for (political) purposes and what would be better alternatives. But no-
tice thatwith the exception of studies of hermeneutical injustice (e.g. Dotson
2012, Fricker 2007, Pohlhaus 2012), and of the invocation of semantic exter-
nalism in defence of a particular counter-intuitive theory of gender and race
word meanings (Haslanger 2012), these literatures tend to fall on one side of
a distinction drawn by Speaks (2019): they are predominantly theories (or
fragments of theories) of meaning, in that they describe what the meanings
of particular expressions (and in the case of mind, concepts) are—albeit in
all of meaning’s varieties; content and force, semantic and pragmatic. But
on the other side of Speaks’ distinction lie foundational theories of mean-
ing. ese latter theories describe not, which meanings expressions have,
but rather, “the facts in virtue of which expressions have the [meanings]
that they have.”1 And yet, “the facts in virtue of which expressions have the
[meanings] that they have” could themselves have political implications and
dynamics and the theories about these facts politically suspect assumptions.
What kind of thing might there be to nd here?
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1 I have changed Speaks’ talk of “semantic contents” to “meanings” because theories ofmean-
ing are just as much about pragmatics, conversational dynamics, implicatures, and the rest
as they are about the semantic content of expressions. Generally speaking, you cannot suc-
cessfully defend a semantic hypothesis without fending o, and integrating it with, prag-
matic alternatives and partners.
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ink of the phenomenon of semantic deference brought to the atten-
tion of the philosophical community by Tyler Burge (1979) and Hilary Put-
nam (1975).eymarshalled evidence and argument for the thesis that some
words have the meanings that they do because of deference given to special
members of a linguistic community: those special persons have more sway
over the content of the speech community’s words than all other members
of the community. Burge and Putnam (and nigh on everyone else) assumed
that, insofar as there are such special persons at all, they are people who
deserved it: experts—people in an epistemically superior position with re-
spect to others. But what if these special persons do not in fact occupy such
a position? What if they are not able, but just the proverbial king?
In a speech given in December 1999, the then president of Estonia
Toomas Hendrik Ilves (1999) spoke of the fact that the word “Baltic” (and
its translations in languages besides English, and their cognates) had been
applied to the Baltics as an outside imposition. e word groups together
countries that share little, but which have been, (to speak euphemistically)
“handled” by outside powers as a single homogeneous unit. As Ilves noted,
“[a] brief excursion into the history of the Baltic idea is useful.”
For centuries, a feudal class of Germans (le over from the Northern
Crusades of the 12th and 13th Centuries) ruled over the native Estonian and
Latvian populations, who functioned as serfs in three provinces: Estland
(northern Estonia), Livland (southern Estonia and northern Latvia), and
Kurland (western Latvia).is serfdom lasted centuries longer than inWest-
ern Europe—right through to the 19th century.
ese three provinces began to be referred to as a single unit, viz. as the
Baltics, neither because native Estonians and Latvians saw themselves as a
single entity, nor because those ruling the provinces saw themselves as simi-
lar to one another (on the contrary: they were highly provincial). Rather, the
category originally came into use because outsiders noticed the commonal-
ity of their predicament (Piirimäe 2017, 59). But as Russian nationalism rose,
and as German pride grew under Bismarck’s unication, the descendants of
the crusaders in the three provinces began to see themselves as a common
unit, with common interests and a common identity.ey themselves then
began enthusiastically using the term to denote themselves.ose whowere
their serfs, and those who saw theGermans as their oppressors, were, by and
large, not those who sought to develop and apply such a category:
ere was an attempt in 1879 by an Estonian journalist Harry Jansen
to launch the concept “Baltia” that would unite all three ethnic groups
in the provinces (Estonians, Latvians, and Germans), proclaiming
that “we are all ‘Balts.”’ But hewas sharply rebuedboth byGermans—
who could not imagine sharing political powerwith peasants—and by
more radical Estonian nationalist “awakeners,” who refused any coop-
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eration with the historical “oppressors,” as the Germans were widely
viewed up to World War II. (Piirimäe 2017, 61)
A little later in time, eorts were made within Germany during the rst
world war to campaign for the annexation of Baltikum on the ground that,
despite the fact that the local people of Estonia and Latvia were Estonians
and Latvians, they nonetheless shared a common German culture (Piirimäe
2017, 64). But as before, Estonians and Latvians did not want such an an-
nexation. It would only have meant the empowering of the German lords in
the region, rather than Estonians and Latvians themselves.
Similarly, during the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
the three countrieswere treated as one and the same for oppressive purposes:
e Soviet Union applied almost identical policies toward all three
states, starting from the ultimatums for military bases in 1939, staged
“revolutions” in 1940, the granting of “Soviet republic” status aer the
incorporation, and ending with mass deportations in the 1940s, as
well as collectivization, nationalization, and other Sovietization prac-
tices. (Piirimäe 2017, 69)
us, a long-term feature of the label “Baltics” (its non-English equivalents,
and cognates) has been the imposition of that label by occupiers (either the
German feudal class occupying Estonia and Latvia, or the Soviets).2 e
ability of these occupiers to get others to see this part of the world in terms
of such a label did not stem from their possession of a sharper eyewithwhich
to recognize the self-standing facts concerning states and their boundaries.
Rather, their ability to do this quite clearly stemmed from their immense
power over the peoples between whom the label does not distinguish, and
because it served their (the occupiers’) interests to divide this region of the
world using the label.
Why do such processes not gure in mainstream theories of “the facts
in virtue of which expressions have the [meanings] that they have”? You can
draw your own conclusions. I am inclined to think that this has much to do
with the broadly comfortable, and relatively homogeneous (U.S.) American
existence of thoseHilarys and Tylers of philosophical lore, andwhat is likely,
2 ere have been, and are, periods during which the Baltic label has been embraced by Es-
tonians and Latvians.ese periods include: the interwar years when Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania sought an alliance with other countries more or less geographically connected
to the Baltic sea, an alliance which could withstand the might of Germany and Russia (an
attempt which, we now know, failed); the period of resistance in the 1980s that eventually
ended with the end of the Soviet occupation and included such things as “the Baltic chain”;
and then again, several years later, once the achievements of the three countries became a
way to take ownership and recongure the Baltic brand away from the immediate Soviet,
and the more distant feudal, past.
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as a result, to occur to them. Be that as it may, it is this kind of potential
that has been neglected and to which the papers in this collection turn their
attention.
Alex Davies, Lauris Kaplinski, and Maarja Lepamets “Meta-Semantic
Moral Encroachment: Some Experimental Evidence” present experimen-
tal evidence that bears upon the truth of a meta-semantic proposal recently
put forward by Díaz-León (2016). Díaz-León proposes that the contextual
factors that bear upon which content a word has in context include moral
and political factors.is, if correct, would suggest that a distinction that has
been commonly drawnwithin the literature on conceptual engineering (and
in parallel: semantic engineering) is to some degree false; namely, that dis-
tinction between which concepts and word meanings we have and use, and
which concepts and meanings we should have and use. Davies, Kaplinksi,
and Lepamets nd evidence consistent with the proposal but the evidence is
only of a weak eect.e eect is not of a size sucient to warrant the kind
of conclusions in aid of which Díaz-León had made the proposal.
Esa Díaz-León “On how to achieve reference to covert social construc-
tions” argues against Ron Mallon’s (2017) attempt to show that expressions
like “race”, “gender” and “sexual orientation” cannot refer to social construc-
tions which are wrongly taken to be biological kinds. Mallon attempts to
show that because speakers would be quite generally mistaken about that
which they are talking when they use such expressions, standard theories of
the meanings of these expressions predict that reference to such construc-
tions is not possible. Díaz-León shows how such theories can indeed per-
mit reference to such constructions by showing that there are more options
available to the social constructionist than Mallon considers.
Je Engelhardt “Ideal DoLLs as Ideology” addresses precisely the issue
raised by “Baltics” described earlier in this introduction: Engelhardt argues
that those defending semantic externalist foundational theories of meaning
(directly: K. Anthony Appiah, Tyler Burge, Sally Haslanger, and Hilary Put-
nam) are defending ideal theories that elide the role played by things other
than epistemic superiority in the determination of word meaning.
Cathal O’Madagain “Epistemic Injustice at the Conceptual Level: Are
WeEntitled toOurOwnConcepts?” describes a hitherto unconsidered kind
of epistemic injustice—one that arises at the level of concepts but which is
dierent in character from hitherto acknowledged forms of epistemic injus-
tice at the conceptual level. Recognition of this kind of epistemic injustice
requires acceptance of a thesis that O’Madagain (with Égré) (2019) has de-
fended elsewhere: viz. that the relative quality of a concept compared to
another is an objective matter.is allows recognition of epistemic injustice
committed not only in episodes of communication but wherever in one’s
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own thinking one uses concepts where one should have deferred to another
knower’s concepts.
Joey Pollock “Conceptual engineering and semantic deference” argues
that successful ameliorative conceptual projects require eschewing the se-
mantic deference characteristic of semantic externalism. Semantic exter-
nalismmay seem to oer the possibility of bringing about ameliorative con-
ceptual change in a way that circumvents the intellectual autonomy of those
who have the concepts in question. For if externalism is true, then it is pos-
sible to change what concepts a person has by changing circumstances of
which those who have the concepts are not directly aware. However, Pollock
shows that many ameliorative conceptual projects require an understanding
of the reasons in favour of the change—if those projects are to be success-
fully brought to completion. is fact rules out the aforementioned possi-
bility seemingly aorded by semantic externalism: viz. the circumvention
of thinkers’ intellectual autonomy.
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